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Abstract—Assurance of information-flow security by formal methods is mandated in security certification of separation kernels. As an
industrial standard for improving safety, ARINC 653 has been complied with by mainstream separation kernels. Due to the new trend of
integrating safe and secure functionalities into one separation kernel, security analysis of ARINC 653 as well as a formal specification
with security proofs are thus significant for the development and certification of ARINC 653 compliant Separation Kernels (ARINC
SKs). This paper presents a specification development and security analysis method for ARINC SKs based on refinement. We propose
a generic security model and a stepwise refinement framework. Two levels of functional specification are developed by the refinement.
A major part of separation kernel requirements in ARINC 653 are modeled, such as kernel initialization, two-level scheduling, partition
and process management, and inter-partition communication. The formal specification and its security proofs are carried out in the
Isabelle/HOL theorem prover. We have reviewed the source code of one industrial and two open-source ARINC SK implementations,
i.e. VxWorks 653, XtratuM, and POK, in accordance with the formal specification. During the verification and code review, six security
flaws, which can cause information leakage, are found in the ARINC 653 standard and the implementations.
Index Terms—Separation Kernels, ARINC 653, Refinement, Formal Specification, Information-flow Security, Common Criteria,
Theorem Proving.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, a trend in embedded systems is to enablemultiple applications from different vendors and with
different criticality levels to share a common set of physical
resources, such as IMA [1] and AUTOSAR [2]. To facilitate
such a model, resources of each application must be pro-
tected from other applications in the system. The separation
kernel [3] and its variants (e.g. partitioning kernels and
partitioning operating systems [4], [5]) establish such an
execution environment by providing to their hosted appli-
cations spatial/temporal separation and controlled informa-
tion flow. Separation kernels, such as PikeOS, VxWorks 653,
INTEGRITY-178B, LynxSecure, and LynxOS-178, have been
widely applied in domains from aerospace and automotive
to medical and consumer electronics.
Traditionally, safety and security of critical systems are
assured by using two kinds of separation kernels respec-
tively, such as VxWorks 653 for safety-critical systems and
VxWorks MILS for security-critical systems. In order to
improve the safety of separation kernels, the ARINC 653
standard [5] has been developed to standardize the system
functionality as well as the interface between the kernel and
applications. ARINC 653 is the premier safety standard and
has been complied with by mainstream separation kernels.
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On the other hand, the security of separation kernels is
usually achieved by the Common Criteria (CC) [6] and
Separation Kernel Protection Profile (SKPP) [7] evaluation,
in which formal verification of information-flow security is
mandated for high assurance levels.
A trend in this field is to integrate the safe and se-
cure functionalities into one separation kernel. For instance,
PikeOS, LynxSecure, and XtratuM are designed to support
both safety-critical and security-critical solutions. Therefore,
it is necessary to assure the security of the functionali-
ties defined in ARINC 653 when developing ARINC 653
compliant Separation Kernels (ARINC SKs). Moreover, a
security verified specification compliant with ARINC 653
and its mechanically checked proofs are highly desirable
for the development and certification of ARINC SKs. The
highest assurance level of CC certification (EAL 7) requires
comprehensive security analysis using formal representa-
tions of the security model and functional specification of
ARINC SKs as well as formal proofs of correspondence
between them. Although formal specification [8], [9], [10],
[11] and verification [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18] of
information-flow security on separation kernels have been
widely studied in academia and industry, information-flow
security of ARINC SKs has not been studied to date. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first effort on this
topic in the literature.
There exist three major challenges to be addressed in this
work. First, the ARINC 653 standard is highly complicated.
It specifies the system functionality and 57 standard services
of separation kernels using more than 100 pages of informal
descriptions. Second, as a sort of hyperproperties [19], it
is difficult to automatically verify information-flow security
on separation kernels so far. Formal analysis of information-
flow security of separation kernels is difficult and needs
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exhausting manual efforts. Moreover, there exist different
definitions of information-flow security (e.g. in [20], [21],
[22], [23]) and the relationship of them on ARINC SKs has
to be clarified. Third, reusability of formal specification and
proofs is important. They should be extensible and easy to
be reused for subsequent development and certification.
This paper presents a specification development and
security analysis method based on stepwise refinement [24],
[25] for ARINC SKs with regard to the EAL 7 of CC certifica-
tion. A separation kernel is an event-driven system reacting
to hypercalls or exceptions, which is alternatively called a
reactive system. Therefore, we borrow design elements from
existing formalisms such as superposition refinement [26] of
reactive systems and Event-B [27]. We start from a generic
security model of ARINC SKs that could be instantiated
as functional specifications at different abstract levels. The
refinement in this paper concretizes an abstract functional
specification by incorporating additional design elements
and by transforming existing ones. The stepwise refinement
addresses the first challenge by modeling complicated re-
quirements of ARINC 653 in a modular and hierarchical
manner. The refinement provides formal proofs of the cor-
respondence between functional specifications for CC certi-
fication. Information-flow security is proven on an abstract
specification and it is preserved in a concrete specification
by means of refinement. Moreover, system functionalities
and services of ARINC 653 are modeled as the event spec-
ification in the functional specification. In such a design,
information-flow security is proven in a compositional way,
i.e. the security of ARINC SKs is implied by the satisfaction
of local properties (unwinding conditions) on events. Thus,
the second challenge is resolved. Using the correctness-
by-construction method based on the refinement, well-
structured specification of ARINC SKs is developed together
with their correctness and security proofs, which helps to
resolve the third challenge.
The challenges mentioned above are not well addressed
in the literature. In formal verification of the seL4 micro-
kernel [28] and its separation extension [16], and the ED
separation kernel [12], refinement methods have been ap-
plied. First, due to the post-hoc verification objective of these
projects, refinement is not a technique to develop the speci-
fication in a stepwise manner, but to prove the conformance
between formalizations at different levels. Therefore, they
have few levels of specification and the refinement is coarse-
grained. Second, ARINC 653 is not the emphasis of these
works and the formal specification are not compliant with
ARINC 653. Information-flow security verification has been
enforced on PikeOS [10], [11], INTEGRITY-178B [13], and an
ARM-based separation kernel [17]. However, refinement is
not considered in these works. Correctness-by-construction
methods have been used to create formal specification of
separation kernels [8], [9], [15], [29]. However, information-
flow security is not the emphasis of them. Formalization and
verification of ARINC 653 have been studied in recent years,
such as the formal specification of ARINC 653 architecture
[30], modeling ARINC 653 for model-driven development of
IMA applications [31], and formal verification of application
software on top of ARINC 653 [32]. In [29], the system
functionalities and all service in ARINC 653 have been
formalized in Event-B, and some inconsistencies have been
found in the standard. These works aim at the safety of
separation kernels and applications. Our work is the first to
conduct a formal security analysis of ARINC 653.
We have used Isabelle/HOL [33] to formalize the secu-
rity model, the refinement method, and functional specifi-
cations as well as to prove information-flow security. All
specifications and security proofs are available at “http:
//securify.scse.ntu.edu.sg/skspecv3/”. In detail, the tech-
nical contributions of this work are as follows.
1) We define a security model, which is a parameterized
abstraction for the execution and security configuration
of ARINC SKs. A set of information-flow security prop-
erties are defined in the model. An inference framework
is proposed to sketch out the implications of the prop-
erties and an unwinding theorem for compositional
reasoning.
2) We propose a refinement framework for stepwise de-
velopment of ARINC SKs. Functional specifications of
ARINC SKs at different levels are instantiations of the
security model, and thus all properties of the security
model are satisfied on the specifications. We define
a security extended superposition refinement for AR-
INC SKs, which supports introducing additional design
elements (e.g. new state variables and new events).
We also show the security proofs of the refinement,
i.e. the preservation of security properties during the
refinement.
3) We develop a top-level specification for ARINC SKs
which covers kernel initialization, partition schedul-
ing, partition management, and inter-partition com-
munication (IPC) according to ARINC 653. A second-
level specification is developed by refining the top-
level one. We add processes, process scheduling, and
process management according to ARINC 653. Security
is proven by refinement.
4) We conduct a code-to-spec review required by CC certi-
fication on one industrial and two open-source ARINC
SK implementations, i.e. VxWorks 653, XtratuM [34],
and POK [35], in accordance with the formal specifica-
tion. During the verification and code review, six covert
channels to leak information [36] have been found in
the ARINC 653 standard and the implementations. The
approaches to fixing them are also provided.
In this paper, we have extended our previous work [37]
by introducing the security model, the refinement frame-
work, the second-level specification, the code review of
VxWorks 653, and four new covert channels. The rest of
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
preliminaries of this paper. Section 3 presents the overview
of our method. The next four sections present the security
model, refinement framework, top-level and second-level
specifications, respectively. Then, Section 8 discusses the se-
curity flaws found in ARINC 653 and the implementations.
Finally, Section 9 gives the conclusion and future work.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Information-flow Security
The notion noninterference is introduced in [38] in order to
provide a formal foundation for the specification and anal-
ysis of information-flow security policies. The idea is that a
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security domain u is noninterfering with a domain v if no
action performed by u can influence the subsequent outputs
seen by v. Language-based information-flow security [21]
assigns either High or Low labels to program variables and
ensures the data confidentiality by preventing information
leakage from High-level data to Low-level data. Transitive
noninterference is too strong and thus is declassified as
intransitive one [39], [40]. That is, the system should allow
certain flows of information from High domains to Low do-
mains, if that flow traverses the appropriate declassifier. In
[20], intransitive noninterference is defined in a state-event
manner and concerns the visibility of events, i.e. the secrets
that events introduce in the system state. Language-based
information-flow security is generalized to arbitrary multi-
domain policies in [22] as a new state-event based notion
nonleakage. In [22], nonleakage and intransitive noninter-
ference are combined as a new notion noninfluence, which
considers both the data confidentiality and the secrecy of
events. Intransitive noninterference [20], [22], [41] in state-
event manner has been applied to verify separation kernels,
such as seL4 [16], PikeOS [11], INTEGRITY-178B [13], and
AAMP7G [14].
2.2 ARINC 653
The ARINC 653 standard is organized in six parts. Part 1 [5]
in Version 3 specifies the baseline operating environment for
application software used within IMA. It defines the system
functionality and requirements of 57 services. ARINC SKs are
mandated to comply with this part. The six major function-
alities specified in ARINC 653 are partition management,
process management, time management, inter- and intra-
partition communication, and health monitoring.
ARINC 653 establishes and separates multiple parti-
tions in time and space except the controlled information
flows along communication channels among partitions. The
security policy used by ARINC SKs is the Inter-Partition
Flow Policy (IPFP) [42], which is intransitive. It is expressed
abstractly in a partition flow matrix partition flow :
partition × partition → mode, whose entries indicate the
mode of the flow. For instance, partition flow(P1, P2) =
QUEUING means that partition P1 is allowed to send
information to partition P2 via a channel with a mes-
sage queue. Another feature of ARINC 653 is its two-level
scheduling, i.e. partition scheduling and process schedul-
ing. For the purpose of temporal separation, the partition
scheduling in ARINC 653 is a fixed, cycle based scheduling
and is strictly deterministic over time. Process scheduling in
a partition is priority preemptive.
2.3 Isabelle/HOL
Isabelle is a generic and tactic-based theorem prover.
We use Isabelle/HOL [33], an implementation of high-
order logic in Isabelle, for our development. The key-
word datatype is used to define an inductive data type.
The list in Isabelle is one of the essential data type
in computing and is defined as datatype ′a list =
Nil (“[]”) | Cons ′a “ ′a list ”(infixr “#”), where [ ]
is the empty list and # is the concatenation. The poly-
morphic option type is defined as datatype ′a option =
None | Some (the : ′a). A function of type ′b ⇀ ′a
Message Transmitter
Scheduler
Partition n......Partition 2Partition 1
Channel Channel
transmit msgs
src port
schedule
schedule
schedule
Applications
(Unclassified)
ARINC 653 Services
Applications
(Top Secret)
ARINC 653 Services
hypercalls
Applications
(Secret)
ARINC 653 Services
hypercalls
Applications
(Top Secret)
ARINC 653 Services
hypercalls
dest port
transmit msgs
processes
hypercalls
processes processes processes
Fig. 1: Architecture of ARINC 653 Separation Kernels
models a partial function, which is equal to ′b⇒ (′a option).
Record types may be defined, for example record point =
xcoord :: int ycoord :: int with the elements like p =
(|xcoord = 10, ycoord = 10|) and projections xcoord p and
ycoord p. Records may be updated, such as p(|xcoord :=
20, ycoord := 20|), and extended, such as record cpoint =
point+ col :: colour. Nonrecursive definitions can be made
with the definition command and the primrec function def-
inition is used for primitive recursions. Locales are Isabelle’s
approach for dealing with parametric theories. Locales may
be instantiated by assigning concrete data to parameters,
and the resulting instantiated declarations are added to
the current context. This is called locale interpretation. In its
simplest form, a locale declaration consists of a sequence of
context elements declaring parameters (the keyword fixes)
and assumptions (the keyword assumes).
To enhance readability, we will use standard mathemat-
ical notation where possible. Examples of formal specifica-
tion will be given in the Isabelle/HOL syntax.
3 METHOD OVERVIEW
The architecture of ARINC SKs we consider in this paper
is shown in Fig. 1. Since ARINC 653 Part 1 in Version
3 [5] is targeted at single-core processing environments,
we consider single-core separation kernels. For simplicity,
separation kernels usually disable interrupts in kernel mode
[16] and thus there is no in-kernel concurrency, which means
that the hypercalls and system events (e.g. scheduling) are
executed in an atomic manner.
We adopt intransitive noninterference in state-event
manner due to its practicality in industry and intransitive
channel-control policies used in ARINC 653. We formalize
various definitions of information-flow security, e.g. non-
interference, nonleakage, and noninfluence. An inference
framework of these properties is provided, in which the
implication relationship among the properties is proven.
Since automatic analysis of information-flow security is
still restricted by the size of state space ( [43], [44]), it is diffi-
cult to deal with operating system kernels so far. Automatic
analysis techniques (e.g. model checking) usually verify one
configuration of the system at a time [45]. However, the
deployment of partitions on separation kernels is unknown
in advance. Therefore, it is well suited to use theorem prov-
ing based approaches. Interactive theorem proving requires
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human intervention and creativity, but produces machine-
checkable proofs required by CC certification. Moreover, it
is not constrained to specific properties or finite state spaces.
This approach is mostly adopted to formal verification of
operating systems [46]. We choose Isabelle/HOL in this
work because (1) it can deal with large-scale formal veri-
fication of real-world systems [47] due to the expressiveness
of HOL, a high degree of proof automation, and powerful
libraries, etc.; (2) most of the OS verification are using
Isabelle/HOL, e.g. seL4 [16], [28] and PikeOS [10], [11];
and (3) Isabelle/HOL is recommended as a formal methods
tools as required by CC certification on high assurance lev-
els [48]. Although other approaches, e.g. Event-B, provide
the refinement framework, properties of information-flow
security could not be formulated straightforwardly by their
inherent specification languages. We could see some efforts
on this direction [49] but no supported tools.
The method overview is shown in Fig. 2. The security
model is a generic model of ARINC SKs for information-
flow security, which includes a state machine based exe-
cution model and the security configuration. The inference
framework presents the implication among these proper-
ties and an unwinding theorem. It follows the classical
unwinding relation based proof [20], i.e. satisfaction of the
general unwinding conditions (GUCs) implies the security.
The security model is a parameterized abstraction, which
means that the kernel components are defined as abstract
types. It could be instantiated to a concrete model, i.e. a
functional specification of ARINC SKs. By this instantiation,
all elements (e.g. properties, implications, and proofs) of the
security model are reused and preserved in the specification.
In order to improve the reusablity of the specification and
proofs, a functional specification is decomposed into two
parts: a kernel execution model and an event specification
for ARINC 653. The execution model is an instance of
the security model, while the event specification defines
Isabelle/HOL functions to implement the state changes
when an event occurs. The concrete functions in the event
specification are invoked by the execution model. By the
instantiation, the properties of the inference framework are
preserved on the specification. The rest of security proofs
of the specification is to show satisfaction of unwinding
conditions (UCs) which are instances of GUCs.
In order to support additional design elements in the
refinement, we use superposition refinement [26] in this
work. Since formal specification of ARINC SKs combines
the system dynamics and security components, we extend
the superposition refinement with security constraints for
ARINC SKs. The state represented by a set of state vari-
ables at the abstract level is transformed into concrete state
variables and extended by new state variables. An event
is refined to a set of concrete events and new events may
be introduced in the refinement. Therefore, in addition to a
state simulation relation, we use an event relation to connect
the abstract and concrete events. To show information-flow
security at the concrete level, UCs of the abstract level are
extended due to the new state variables and new events.
The proofs of UCs at the concrete level only consider the
new state variables and security proofs at the abstract level
are reused. In the case of data refinement, i.e. without
introducing new events and new state variables, security
is automatically preserved in the refinement.
A major part of requirements in ARINC 653 are modeled
in this work. We develop two levels of specification by
refinement. ARINC SKs use IPC to implement controlled
information flows among partitions. Moreover, in the IPFP
policy of ARINC 653, communication ports and channels are
associated with partitions, and all processes in a partition
can access the ports configured for this partition. Therefore,
we model functionalities related to information flows, i.e.
partition management and IPC services, in the top-level
functional specification. For functional completeness, kernel
initialization and partition scheduling are also modeled. At
the second level, we use the refinement to add process
scheduling and process management services, which are
functionalities in partitions. Other functionalities and ser-
vices of ARINC 653 are possible to be added by refinement
in future.
4 SECURITY MODEL OF SEPARATION KERNELS
We design a security model for ARINC SKs in this section.
The model consists of a nondeterministic state machine,
the security configuration of ARINC SKs, information-flow
security properties, and an inference framework of these
properties.
4.1 State Machine and Security Configuration
The state-event based information-flow security uses a state
machine to represent the system model. For universality,
we adopt a nondeterministic model. The state machine of
ARINC SKs is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (State Machine of ARINC SKs). M =
〈S, E , ϕ, s0〉 is a tuple, where S is the state space, E is
the set of event labels, s0 ∈ S is the initial state, and
ϕ : E → P(S × S) is the state-transition function.
The ϕ function characterises the single-step behaviour of
separation kernels by executing an event, such as a hypercall
or scheduling. The auxiliary functions used in the security
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run([ ]) = Id
run(e#es) = ϕ(e) ◦ run(es)
s# es , {s} run(es)
R(s) , ∃es. (s0, s) ∈ run(es)
s
D≈ t , ∀d ∈ D. s d∼ t ss d ts , ∀s t. s ∈ ss ∧ t ∈ ts −→ s d∼ t
sources([ ], s, d) = {d}
sources(e#es, s, d) = (
⋃
{sources(es, s′, d) | (s, s′) ∈ ϕ(e)}) ∪
{w | w = kdom(s, e) ∧ (∃v s′. (w ; v)
∧ (s, s′) ∈ ϕ(e) ∧ v ∈ sources(es, s′, d))}
ipurge([ ], d, ss) = [ ]
ipurge(e#es, d, ss) = if(∃s ∈ ss. kdom(s, e) ∈ sources(e#es, s, d))
then
e#ipurge(es, d, (
⋃
s∈ss
{s′ | (s, s′) ∈ ϕ(e)}))
else ipurge(es, d, ss)
Fig. 3: Auxiliary Functions in Security Model
model are defined in detail in Fig. 3. Based on the ϕ function,
we define the run function to represent the execution of a
sequence of events. The execution(s, es) function (denoted
as s # es) returns the set of final states by executing a
sequence of events es from a state s, where  is the domain
restriction of a relation. By the execution function, the
reachability of a state s is defined as reachable(s) (denoted
as R(s)).
The security configuration of separation kernels is usu-
ally comprised of security domains, security policies, do-
main of events, and state equivalence as follows.
Security domains: Applications in partitions have vari-
ous security levels. We consider each partition as a security
domain. Since partition scheduling is strictly determinis-
tic over time, we define a security domain scheduler for
partition scheduling, which cannot be interfered by any
other domains to ensure that the scheduler does not leak
information via its scheduling decisions. Note that process
scheduling is conducted in partitions. Since ARINC 653 de-
fines the channel-based communication services using ports
and leaves the implementation of message transmission
over channels to underlying separation kernels, a security
domain message transmitter is defined for message transmis-
sion. The transmitter also decouples message transmission
from the scheduler to ensure that the scheduler is not
interfered by partitions. Therefore, the security domains (D)
of ARINC SKs are the scheduler (S), the transmitter (T), and
the configured partitions (P), i.e. D = P ∪ {S,T}.
Security policies: In order to discuss information-flow
security policies, we assume an interference relation ;⊆
D × D according to the partition flow matrix and /; is
the complement relation of ;. If there is a channel from
a partition p1 to a partition p2, then p1 ; T and T ; p2
since the transmitter is the message intermediator. Since
the scheduler can possibly schedule other domains, it can
interfere with them. In order to prevent the scheduler from
leaking information via its scheduling decisions, we require
that no other domains can interfere with the scheduler.
Domain of events: Traditional formulations in the state-
event based approach assume a static mapping from events
to domains, such that the domain of an event can be deter-
mined solely from the event itself [20]. However, in separa-
tion kernels that mapping is dynamic [23]. When a hypercall
occurs, the kernel must consult the partition scheduler to
determine which partition is currently executing, and the
current executing partition is the domain of the hypercall.
On the other hand, separation kernels can provide specific
hypercalls which are only available to privileged partitions.
Therefore, the domain of an event is represented as a partial
function kdom : S × E ⇀ D.
State equivalence: It means states are identical for a
security domain. We define an equivalence relation ∼ on
states for each domain such that s d∼ t if and only if states s
and t are identical for domain d, that is to say states s and t
are indistinguishable for d. Two states are equivalent for the
scheduler when domains of each event in the two states are
the same. For a set of domains D, we define s
D≈ t as shown
in Fig. 3 to represent that states s and t are equivalent for
all domains in D. For two sets of states ss and ts, we define
ss
d ts as shown in Fig. 3 to represent that any two states
in ss and ts are equivalent for domain d.
Based on the discussion above, we define the security
model of ARINC SKs as follows. We assume that each event
is always enabled in a state. Whenever an event e should
not be executed in a state s, it does not change the state.
Definition 2 (Security Model of ARINC SKs).
SM = 〈M,D, kdom,;,∼〉
with assumptions as follows.
1) ∀p1, p2 ∈ P. p1 ; p2 −→ p1 ; T ∧ T; p2
2) ∀d ∈ D. S; d
3) ∀d ∈ D. d; S −→ d = S
4) ∼ is an equivalence relation.
5) ∀s t e. s S∼ t −→ kdom(s, e) = kdom(t, e)
6) events are enabled in any state, i.e. ∀s e. R(s) −→
(∃s′. (s, s′) ∈ ϕ(e)).
The security model is represented in Isabelle/HOL as a
locale SM, which could be instantiated to create functional
specification.
4.2 Information-flow Security Properties
In order to express the allowed information flows for the
intransitive policies, we use a function sources(es, s, d) as
shown in Fig. 3, which yields the set of domains that
are allowed to pass information to domain d when event
sequence es occurs from state s. It is inductively defined
on event sequences. We include in sources(e#es, s, d) all
domains that can pass information to d when es occurs from
all successor states s′ of s, as well as the domain kdom(s, e)
performing the event e, whenever there exists some inter-
mediate domain v by which the domain kdom(s, e) can
pass information to d indirectly. In the intransitive purged
sequence (ipurge(es, d, ss) in Fig. 3), the events of partitions
that are not allowed to pass information to d directly or
indirectly are removed. Given an event sequence e#es
executing from a set of state ss, ipurge keeps the first event
e if this event is allowed to affect the target domain d, i.e.
∃s ∈ ss. kdom(s, e) ∈ sources(e#es, s, d). It then continues
on the remaining events es from the successor states of ss
after executing e. On the other hand, if e is not allowed
to affect the target domain d, then it is removed from the
sequence and purging continues on the remaining events es
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TABLE 1: Information-flow Security Properties
No. Properties
(1) noninterference:
∀d es. (s0 # es) d (s0 # ipurge(es, d, {s0}))
(2) weak noninterference:∀d es1 es2. ipurge(es1, d, {s0}) = ipurge(es2, d, {s0})
−→ ((s0 # es1) d (s0 # es2))
(3) noninterference r:
∀d es s. R(s) −→ ((s# es) d (s# ipurge(es, d, {s}))
(4) weak noninterference r:∀d es1 es2 s. R(s)
∧ ipurge(es1, d, {s}) = ipurge(es2, d, {s})
−→ ((s# es1) d (s# es2))
(5) nonleakage:
∀d es s t. R(s) ∧R(t) ∧ (s S∼ t) ∧ (s sources(es,s,d)≈ t)
−→ ((s# es) d (t# es))
(6) weak noninfluence:
∀d es1 es2 s t. R(s) ∧R(t) ∧ (s
sources(es1,s,d)≈ t)
∧ (s S∼ t) ∧ ipurge(es1, d, {s}) = ipurge(es2, d, {t})
−→ ((s# es1) d (t# es2))
(7) noninfluence:
∀d es s t. R(s) ∧R(t) ∧ (s sources(es,s,d)≈ t) ∧ (s S∼ t)
−→ ((s# es) d (t# ipurge(es, d, {t})))
from the current set of states ss. The observational equiva-
lence of an execution is denoted as (s# es1)
d (t# es2),
which means that a domain d is identical to any two final
states after executing es1 from s (s # es1) and executing
es2 from t.
The intransitive noninterference [20] on the execution
model is defined as noninterference in Table 1. Its intuitive
meaning is that events of domains that cannot interfere
with a domain d should not affect d. Formally, given an
event sequence es and a domain d, final states after exe-
cuting es from the initial state s0 and after executing its
purged sequence from s0 are identical to d. In noninterfer-
ence, the ipurge function only deletes all unsuitable events.
Another version is introduced in [22] to handle arbitrary
insertion and deletion of secret events, which is defined as
weak noninterference in Table 1. In weak noninterference, we
only ask for two event sequences which have the same
effects on the target domain d, i.e. ipurge(es1, d, {s0}) =
ipurge(es2, d, {s0}). The above definitions of noninterfer-
ence are based on the initial state s0, but separation kernels
usually support warm or cold start and they may start to
execute from a non-initial state. Therefore, we define a more
general version noninterferece r based on the reachable func-
tion R. This general noninterference requires that systems
starting from any reachable state are secure. It is obvious
that this noninterference implies the classical noninterfer-
ence due to R(s0) = True. Weak noninterference is also
generalized as a new property weak noninterference r.
Nonleakage and noninflunce are defined for ARINC SKs
based on the scheduler as shown in Table 1. The intuitive
meaning of nonleakage is that if data are not leaked initially,
data should not be leaked during executing a sequence of
events. Separation kernels are said to preserve nonleakage
Ge
ne
ral
 U
nw
ind
ing
 C
on
dit
ion
s
noninfluence
nonleakage
noninterference
noninterference_r
weak_noninterference
weak_noninterference_r
weak_noninfluence
ste
p c
on
sis
ten
t
loc
ally
 re
sp
ec
ts
Fig. 4: Inference Framework of Security Properties
when for any pair of reachable states s and t and an
observing domain d, if (1) s and t are equivalent for all
domains that may (directly or indirectly) interfere with d
during the execution of es, i.e. s
sources(es,s,d)≈ t, and (2)
the same domain is currently executing in both states, i.e.
s
S∼ t, then s and t are observationally equivalent for
d and es. Noninfluence is the combination of nonleakage
and noninterference to ensure that there is no secrete data
leakage and secrete events are not visible according to secu-
rity policies. Murray et al. [23] have defined noninfluence
for seL4, which is a weaker one and defined as weak
noninfluence in Table 1. Similar to weak noninterference, it can
handle arbitrary insertion and deletion of secret events. It
is the combination of weak noninterference r and nonleakage.
We propose a stronger one, i.e. noninfluence, according to the
original definition [22] by extending the scheduler and the
state reachability. It is the combination of noninterference r
and nonleakage. In the next subsection, we will show that
noninfluence is actually the conjunction of noninterference
and nonleakage.
4.3 Inference Framework of Security Properties
The inference framework clarifies the implication relations
among the security properties on the security model. We
have proven all implication relations as shown in Fig. 4,
where an arrow means the implication between properties.
The standard proof of information-flow security is dis-
charged by proving a set of unwinding conditions [20]
that examine individual execution steps of the system. This
paper also follows this approach. We first define the un-
winding conditions on event (UCE) as follows.
Definition 3 (Step Consistent Condition of Event).
SC(e) , ∀d s t. R(s) ∧R(t) ∧ (s d∼ t) ∧ (s S∼ t)
∧ (kdom(s, e); d) ∧ (s kdom(s,e)∼ t)
−→ (∀s′ t′. (s, s′) ∈ ϕ(e) ∧ (t, t′) ∈ ϕ(e) −→ s′ d∼ t′)
Definition 4 (Locally Respects Condition of Event).
LR(e) , ∀d s s′. R(s) ∧ (kdom(s, e) /; d) ∧ (s, s′) ∈ ϕ(e)
−→ (s d∼ s′)
The step consistent condition requires that for any pair
of reachable states s and t, and any observing domain
d, the next states after executing an event e in s and t
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are indistinguishable for d, i.e. s′ d∼ t′, if (1) s and t are
indistinguishable for d, (2) the current executing domains
in s and t are the same, (3) the domain of e in state s can
interference with d, and (4) s and t are indistinguishable for
the domain of e. The locally respects condition means that
an event e that executes in a state s can affect only those
domains to which the domain executing e is allowed to send
information.
Based on the UCEs, the general unwinding conditions
of the security model can be defined as SC , ∀e. SC(e)
and LR , ∀e. LR(e). The soundness and completeness of
unwinding conditions in the security model are shown as
follows, where the soundness is the unwinding theorem in
[20], [22].
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness of Unwinding
Conditions). The security model SM satisfies that
(SC ∧ LR) = noninfluence and SC = nonleakage
The objective of noninfluence is to ensure data confiden-
tiality and secrecy of events by combing noninterference and
nonleakage. We show the soundness and completeness of
noninfluence in the security model as follows.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and Completeness of Noninfluence).
The security model SM satisfies that
noninfluence = (noninterference r ∧ nonleakage) and
weak noninfluence = (weak noninterference r
∧ nonleakage)
5 SPECIFICATION AND REFINEMENT FRAMEWORK
After discussing the security model, we present the func-
tional specification by instantiating the security model and
a refinement framework for stepwise specification develop-
ment in this section.
5.1 Specification by Security Model Instantiation
A functional specification consists of a kernel execu-
tion model and an event specification. The kernel exe-
cution model is an instance of the security model. The
instantiation is an interpretation of the SM locale, i.e.
SMI = interpretation SM{s0/s0I , ϕ/ϕI , kdom/kdomI ,
S/Sched,T/Trans,∼ / ∼I ,; / ;I}, where the param-
eters of SM are substituted by concrete ones. In order
to assure the correctness of the instantiation, we provide
the instantiation proof to show that the instance parameters
preserve the assumptions of SM.
The event specification is a mapping from events to a
set of functions to model the functionalities and services in
ARINC 653. The ϕI function in the execution model exe-
cutes events by invoking these functions. Thus, a functional
specification of ARINC SKs is defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Functional Specification of ARINC SKs). A
functional specification is a tuple SK = 〈SMI , F 〉,
where
1) SMI = 〈MI ,DI , kdomI ,;I ,∼I〉 is the execution
model, whereMI = 〈SI , EI , ϕI , s0I〉.
2) F : EI → Γ is the event specification, where Γ is the set
of functions and each f ∈ Γ has the type SI → P(SI).
3) ϕI inMI defines the execution of each event e, where
ϕI(e) = {(s, t) | t ∈ F (e)(s)}.
5.2 Specification Refinement
In the superposition refinement, existing state variables and
events can be refined. In addition, new state variables and
events can be added to an abstract specification. Here,
we use subscripts A and C to represent the abstract and
concrete specifications, respectively. During the refinement
the abstract state SA can be transformed into ST and new
state variables denoted as S∆ can be incorporated. Thus,
the concrete state SC = ST + S∆, where the symble “+”
is the extension of data type (e.g. record extension in Is-
abelle/HOL). The security extended superposition refine-
ment for the functional specification is defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Refinement). Given two functional specifica-
tions SKA and SKC , SKC refines SKA using a state
simulation relation Ψ : SC → SA and an event relation
Θ : EC → (EA ∪ {τ}), denoted as SKA vΨ,Θ SKC , if
1) the initial state in SKC establishesR, i.e. Ψ(s0C) = s0A.
2) each event in EA is refined by a set of events in EC , i.e. Θ
is a surjection and ∀e s t. Θ(e) 6= τ ∧ (s, t) ∈ ϕC(e) −→
(Ψ(s),Ψ(t)) ∈ ϕA(Θ(e)).
3) new events only change the new state variables in-
troduced in the refinement and does not affect the
variables in SKA, i.e. ∀e s t. Θ(e) = τ ∧ (s, t) ∈
ϕC(e) −→ Ψ(t) = Ψ(s).
4) security domains are preserved and refined events has
the same execution domain as that at the abstract level,
i.e. DC = DA and ∀e s. Θ(e) 6= τ −→ kdomC(s, e) =
kdomA(Ψ(s),Θ(e)).
5) the refinement does not change the interference rela-
tion, i.e. ;C = ;A.
6) s d∼C t = Ψ(s) d∼A Ψ(t) ∧ s d∼∆ t, where ∼∆ only
considers the new state variables S∆ introduced in the
refinement.
The relation Ψ maps concrete states to abstract ones. It
is actually the transformation of SA to ST . Abstract states
of next states by executing an event e in a state t at the
concrete level is a subset of next states by executing the
refined event Θ(e) in a state s (s = Ψ(t)) at the abstract level.
If the event is a new one at the concrete level, its execution
should not affect the abstract state. We could consider that a
new event at the concrete level refines a τ action, which does
not change the abstract states. The security configuration at
the abstract level is preserved in the refinement, i.e. (1) S, T,
partitionsD, and the relation; are the same, (2) the domain
of events at the abstract level is preserved, and (3) the state
equivalence relation at the abstract level is preserved, while
the relation at the concrete level also requires that the two
states are equivalent for the new state variables (i.e. ∼∆).
The refinement in this paper is reflexive and transitive.
The correctness is ensured by Theorem 3. Since noninterfer-
ence considers the state and event together, our refinement
implies that the state-event trace set of a concrete specifi-
cation is a subset of the abstract one. Thus, the refinement
preserves noninterference as we present in the next subsec-
tion.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of Refinement). If SKA and SKC are
instances of SM and SKA vΨ,Θ SKC , then
∀es. Ψ∗(s0C # es) ⊆ s0A # Θ∗(es)
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In the theorem, Ψ∗ maps a set of concrete states to a
set of abstract states by the relation Ψ, and Θ∗ maps a
sequence of concrete events to a sequence of abstract events
by the relation Θ. The τ event is ignored during executing a
sequence of events at the abstract level.
From the definition of the refinement, we could see that
for any reachable state s at the concrete level, its abstract
state on the Ψ relation is also reachable at the abstract level.
Lemma 1 (State Reachability in Refinement). If SKA and
SKC are instances of SM and SKA vΨ,Θ SKC , then
∀s. RC(s) −→ RA(Ψ(s))
Superposition refinement [26] assumes the termination
of new events introduced in the refinement. Since hypercalls
and system events of ARINC SKs terminate, we assume
that events terminate in our refinement framework. In the
formal specification of ARINC SKs, we use the primrec and
definition in Isabelle/HOL to define the event specification.
Thus, the termination of events is automatically ensured in
Isabelle/HOL.
5.3 Security Proofs of Refinement
The security proofs of a concrete specification also follow
the unwinding theorem introduced in Subsection 4.3. Since
a concrete specification is an instance of the security model,
we have following theorem according to Theorem 1.
Theorem 4 (Unwinding Theorem for Concrete Specification).
If SKC is an instances of SM and SKC satisfies SCC ∧
LRC , then SKC satisfies noninfluence.
We define the step consistent condition of events on the
new state variables as follows.
Definition 7 (Step Consistent Condition of Event on New
State Variables).
SCC∆(e) , ∀ d s t. RC(s) ∧RC(t) ∧ (s d∼C t) ∧ (s S∼C t)
∧ (kdomC(s, e);C d) ∧ (s kdomC(s,e)∼C t)
−→ (∀s′ t′. (s, s′) ∈ ϕC(e) ∧ (t, t′) ∈ ϕC(e) −→ s′ d∼∆ t′)
The locally respects condition of events on the new
state variables is defined in an analogous manner. Based on
definitions of the refinement and the unwinding conditions
as well as Lemma 1, we have four lemmas shown as follows.
Lemma 2 (Step Consistent of Event Refinement). If SKA and
SKC are instances of SM and SKA vΨ,Θ SKC , then
∀ e. Θ(e) 6= τ ∧ SCA(Θ(e)) ∧ SCC∆(e) −→ SCC(e)
Lemma 3 (Locally Respects of Event Refinement). If SKA
and SKC are instances of SM and SKA vΨ,Θ SKC ,
then
∀ e. Θ(e) 6= τ ∧ LRA(Θ(e)) ∧ LRC∆(e) −→ LRC(e)
Lemma 4 (Step Consistent of New Event in Refinement).
If SKA and SKC are instances of SM and SKA vΨ,Θ
SKC , then
∀ e. Θ(e) = τ ∧ SC∆(e) −→ SCC(e)
Lemma 5 (Locally Respects of New Event in Refinement).
If SKA and SKC are instances of SM and SKA vΨ,Θ
SKC , then
∀ e. Θ(e) = τ ∧ LR∆(e) −→ LRC(e)
Finally, based on these lemmas and Theorem 4, we have
Theorem 5. The theorem means that if SKC is a refinement
of SKA and SKA satisfies the unwinding conditions, we
only need to prove the unwinding conditions on new state
variables to show information-flow security of SKC .
Theorem 5 (Security of Refinement). If SKA and SKC
are instances of SM, SKA satisfies SCA ∧ LRA, SKC
satisfies SC∆ ∧ LR∆, and SKA vΨ,Θ SKC , then SKC
satisfies noninfluence.
In the case of data refinement, i.e. without new events
and new state variables introduced in the refinement,
information-flow security is automatically preserved on the
concrete specification.
Corollary 1. If SKA and SKC are instances of SM, SKA
satisfies SCA ∧ LRA, SKA vΨ,Θ SKC , @e. Θ(e) = τ ,
and ∀s t d. s d∼∆ t, then SKC satisfies noninfluence.
6 TOP-LEVEL SPECIFICATION AND SECURITY
PROOFS
In the top-level functional specification, we model kernel
initialization, partition scheduling, partition management,
and inter-partition communication defined in ARINC 653.
We first instantiate the security model as the kernel execu-
tion model. Then, we present the event specification. Finally,
security proofs are discussed.
6.1 Kernel Execution Model
Basic components at the top level are partitions and com-
munication objects. A partition is basically the same as a
program in a single application environment [5]. IPC is
conducted via messages on channels configured among par-
titions. Partitions have access to channels via ports which are
the endpoints of channels. The modes of transferring mes-
sages over channels are queuing and sampling. A significant
characteristic of ARINC SKs is that the basic components
are statically configured at built-time. Partitions, communi-
cation objects, and the system configuration are specified
in Isabelle/HOL as “record Sys Config” and defined as
a constant “conf::Sys Config” in the top-level specification.
When creating ports by invoking IPC services in a partition,
only configured ports in the partition are created. A set of
configuration constraints are defined to ensure the correct-
ness of the system configuration.
We first instantiate the security model by a set of concrete
parameters as follows.
Events: We consider two types of events in the spec-
ification: hypercalls and system events. Hypercalls cover all
partition management and IPC services in ARINC 653.
System events are the actions of the kernel itself and include
kernel initialization, scheduling, and transmitting messages
over channels. Other types of events could be introduced
during subsequent refinements. Events are illustrated in Fig.
1 as dotted line arrows and italics.
Kernel State and Transition: In the top-level specifi-
cation, the kernel state concerns states of partitions, the
scheduler, and ports. The state of a partition consists of its
operating mode (partitions) and the created ports (part
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ports). The state of the scheduler shows which is the current
executing partition (cur). The state of a port is mainly about
messages in its buffer (comm). The datatype Port Type
models sampling and queuing mode ports as well as their
message buffers. We define the type of port id as natural
number and use the partial functions to store the created
ports and their states. We prove a set of invariants about
types in the specification, such as the domain of part ports
is the same as that of comm in all reachable states.
record State = partitions :: part id ⇀ part mode type
part ports :: port id ⇀ part id
cur :: domain id comm :: port id ⇀ Port Type
The state transition function ϕ is instantiated as the
exec event function in the top-level specification, in which
the mapping function F in Definition 5 is also modeled.
Event Domain: The domain of the system events is
static: the domain of the event scheduling is S and the domain
of message transmission is T. The domain of hypercalls is
dynamic and depends on the current state of the kernel.
It is defined as kdom s (hyperc h) = cur s, where cur s
returns the current executing partition in the state s.
Interference Relation: The interference relation in the
security model is instantiated as the function interference1 as
follows in the top-level specification.
definition interference1 :: domain-id⇒ domain-id⇒ bool ((- ; -))
where interference1 d1 d2 ≡
if d1 = d2 then True
else if is-sched conf d1 then True
else if ¬(is-sched conf d1) ∧ (is-sched conf d2) then False
else if is-part conf d1 ∧ is-trm conf d2 then part-intf-trm conf d1
else if is-trm conf d1 ∧ is-part conf d2 then trm-intf-part conf d2
else False
The interference1 is in conformance with the assump-
tions 1) - 3) in Definition 2.
State Equivalence: For a partition d, s d∼ t if and only if
vpeq part s d t, which is defined as follows.
definition vpeq part :: “State⇒ part id⇒ (State × bool)” where
vpeq part s d t ≡ (partitions s) d = (partitions t) d ∧ vpeq part comm s d t
It means that states s and t are equivalent for partition
d, when the partition state and the communication abilities
of d on these two states are the same. An example of the
communication ability is that if a destination queuing port
p is not empty in two states s and t, partition d has the
same ability on p in s as in t. This is because d is able to
receive a message from p in the two states. The equivalence
of communication abilities defines that partition d has the
same set of ports, and that the number of messages is the
same for all destination ports on states s and t.
Two states s and t are equivalent for the scheduler when
the current executing partition in the two states are the
same. The equivalence of states for the transmitter requires
that all ports and states of the ports are the same.
6.2 Event Specification
The event specification on the top level models kernel
initialization, partition scheduling, all services of IPC and
partition management defined in ARINC 653.
Kernel Initialization and Scheduling: The kernel initial-
ization considers initialization of the kernel state, which is
Partition1
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source/queuing port
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send read
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Fig. 5: Channel-based Communication in ARINC 653
defined as s0 = system init conf . The system init func-
tion assigns initial values to the kernel state according to
the kernel configuration. Because the execution of message
transmission is also under the control of scheduling, we
define an abstract partition scheduling as follows that non-
deterministically chooses one partition or the transmitter as
the current executing domain, where partconf is a field of
Sys Config with the type partition id ⇀ Partition Conf
to store the configured partitions.
definition schedule :: “Sys Config⇒ State⇒ State” where
schedule sc s ≡ s(|cur := SOME p. p∈ {x. (partconf sc) x 6= None
∨ x = T sc}|)
Partition Management: Partition management services
in ARINC 653 are available to the application software
for setting a partition’s operating mode and to obtain a
partition’s status. The Set Partition Mode service request is
used to set the operating mode of the current partition to
NORMAL after the initialization of the partition is com-
plete. The service is also used for setting the partition
back to IDLE (partition shutdown), and to COLD START or
WARM START (partition restart), when a fault is detected
and processed. The Set Partition Mode service is specified as
follows. The partition mode transition in ARINC 653 does
not allow transitting from COLD START to WARM START.
The function updates the operating mode of the current
executing partition.
definition set part mode :: Sys Config⇒ State⇒ part mode type⇒ State
where
set part mode sc s m ≡
(if (partitions s) (cur s) 6= None ∧
¬ (the ((partitions s) (cur s)) = COLD START
∧ m = WARM START) then
let pts = partitions s in s(|partitions := pts(cur s := Some m )|)
else s)
Inter-partition Communication: The communication ar-
chitecture is illustrated in Fig. 5. In the first stage of this
work, we design the event specification completely based
on the service behavior specified in ARINC 653. When
proving the unwinding conditions on these events, we find
covert channels (Section 8 in detail). We change the service
specification in ARINC 653 by allowing message loss to
avoid these covert channels according to the results in [50].
We use a set of functions to implement one service.
For instance, the Send Queuing Message service is imple-
mented by the send que msg lost function as follows. The
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manipulated port should be a source (is source port s p)
and queuing (is a queuingport s p) port. It should belong
to current partition too (is a port of partition s p). If the
message buffer of the port is full (is full portqueuing), the
service just omits the message. Otherwise, the message is
inserted into the buffer (insert msg2queuing port).
definition send que msg lost :: “Sys Config ⇒ State ⇒ port id ⇒ Mes-
sage⇒ (State × bool)” where
send que msg lost sc s p m ≡
(if(¬ is a queuingport s p ∨ ¬ is source port s p
∨ ¬ is a port of partition s p ) then (s, False)
else if is full portqueuing sc s p then (s, True)
else (insert msg2queuing port s p m, True))
The message transmission on channels is shown in Fig.
5. For instance, the message transmission in queuing mode
is specified as follows. If the source and destination port
have been created (get portid by name s sn 6= None) and
there are messages in the buffer of the source port (has msg
inportqueuing), a message in the buffer is removed (remove
msg from queuingport) and inserted into the buffer of the
destination port. When the buffer of the destination port
is full (is full portqueuing), the message is discarded.
primrec transf que msg lost :: “Sys Config⇒ State⇒ Channel Type
⇒ State” where
transf que msg lost sc s (Queuing sn dn) =
(let sp = get portid by name s sn; dp = get portid by name s dn in
if sp 6= None ∧ dp 6= None ∧ has msg inportqueuing s (the sp) then
let sm = remove msg from queuingport s (the sp) in
if is full portqueuing sc (fst sm) (the dp) then s
else insert msg2queuing port (fst sm) (the dp) (the (snd sm))
else s ) |
transf que msg lost sc s (Sampling ) = s
6.3 Security Proofs
Since the top-level specification is an instance of the security
model, the first part of the security proofs is the instantia-
tion proof. The assumptions 1) - 3) of the security model
(Definition 2) on the interference relation are preserved by
the interference1 function. The assumption 4) is preserved
by ∼ for the scheduler. The definition of ∼ is an equivalence
relation at the top level, which means the preservation of
the assumption 5). By the following lemma, the assumption
6) of the security model is preserved by the top-level speci-
fication.
Lemma 6 (Event Enabled in Top-level Specification).
∀s e. R(s) −→ (∃s′. (s, s′) ∈ exec event(e))
The second step of the security proofs is to show the
UCEs, i.e. satisfaction of Definitions 3 and 4. We define a set
of concrete conditions for events. Satisfaction of the concrete
conditions of one event implies that the event satisfies the
UCEs. For instance, Definition 8 shows the concrete con-
dition of step consistent for the Create Queuing Port event,
which is an instance of UCEs of the event.
Definition 8 (Concrete SC(e) of Creating Queuing Port).
∀ d s t s′ t′ p. R(s) ∧R(t) ∧ s d∼ t ∧ s S∼ t
∧ is part conf (cur s) ∧ (cur s); d ∧ s cur s∼ t
∧ s′ = fst (create queuing port conf s p)
∧ t′ = fst (create queuing port conf t p)
−→ s′ d∼ t′
Finally, we conclude the satisfaction of the noninflu-
ence property on the top-level specification and all other
information-flow security properties according to the infer-
ence framework of the security model.
7 SECOND-LEVEL SPECIFICATION AND SECURITY
PROOFS
In the second-level specification, we refine the top-level
one by adding processes, process scheduling in partitions,
and process management services in ARINC 653. We first
instantiate the security model as the kernel execution model.
Then, we present the refinement. Finally, the security proofs
of the specification are discussed.
7.1 Kernel Execution Model
In ARINC 653, a partition comprises one or more pro-
cesses that combine dynamically to provide the functions
associated with that partition [5]. Processes are separated
among partitions, while processes within a partition share
the resources of the partition. Process management provides
the services to control the life-cycle of processes. We refine
the state at the top-level as follows. The state variables at
the top level are not changed. The state is extended by new
state variables of processes by means of record extension.
Thus, the state relation R is simple and defined as follows.
A partition has a set of created processes (procs) and may
have a current executing process (cur proc part). A process
has a state (proc state). We found a covert channel if we use
global process identifiers (Section 8 in detail). Here, we use
separated process identifiers for each partition.
record StateR = State +
procs :: partition-id ⇀ (process-id set)
cur-proc-part :: partition-id ⇀ process-id
proc-state :: partition-id × process-id ⇀ Proc-State
definition R :: StateR⇒ State (⇑- [50]) where
R r = (|cur = cur r, partitions = partitions r,
comm = comm r, part-ports = part-ports r |)
Each event at the top level is refined by one at the second
level. We add events for process scheduling and process
management services. The exec event function at the top
level is extended by adding maps of new events to new
functions in the event specification. The event domain and
the interference relation at the second level are the same
as those at the top level. The state equivalence relation is
extended on new state variables as s d. ∼ . t as follows.
The state equivalence on new state variables, i.e. s d∼∆ t
in Definition 6, is defined as s d. ∼∆ . t at the second level.
It requires that the processes of a partition d, the states of
processes, and the current executing process in the partition
are the same in states s and t.
definition vpeqR :: StateR⇒ domain-id⇒ StateR⇒ bool ((- ∼. - .∼ -))
where vpeqR s d t ≡ (R s) ∼ d ∼ (R t) ∧ (s∼.d.∼∆t)
7.2 Event Specification
Due to the new events introduced in the refinement, we
use new functions to implement the process management
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Fig. 6: Process State Transitions in Second-level Specification
and scheduling. The existing functions in the top-level spec-
ification are refined according to the new state type. The
process state transitions in the second-level specification are
shown in Fig. 6. We capture all state transitions defined in
ARINC 653 except those triggered by intra-partition com-
munication, which will be modeled in future refinement.
Process Management: Seven basic services of process
management in ARINC 653, i.e. Create/Start/Stop/Suspend/
Resume Process, Set Priority, and Get Process Status, are
modeled at the second level. We use a set of functions
to implement these services. For instance, Start Process is
implemented by the start process function as follows.
definition start-process :: StateR⇒ process-id⇒ StateR where
start-process s p ≡
if p ∈ the ((procs s) (cur s)) ∧
(state (the ((proc-state s) (cur s, p)))) = DORMANT then
let st = (if the ((partitions s) (cur s)) = NORMAL
then READY else WAITING);
pst = the ((proc-state s) (cur s, p));
proc-state ′= (proc-state s) ((cur s, p) :=
Some (pst (|state := st|))) in
s(|proc-state:=proc-state ′|) else s
The process to be started should belong to the current
executing partition and be in DORMANT state. As shown
in Fig. 6, if the current partition is in NORMAL mode, the
new state of the process is READY. Otherwise, the new state
is WAITING.
Process Scheduling: ARINC 653 defines a priority based
process scheduling in partitions, which is implemented as
follows. The process scheduling occurs in a partition only
when the partition is in NORMAL mode. It first sets the state
of the current executing process to READY (setRun2Ready).
Then it chooses one of processes in READY state with
highest priority in the current partition. Finally, it sets the
chosen process as the current executing process of the cur-
rent partition.
definition schedule-process :: StateR⇒ StateR set where
schedule-process s ≡
if is-part conf (cur s) ∧
(the ((partitions s) (cur s))) = NORMAL then
(let s ′= setRun2Ready s;
readyprs = {p. p∈the (procs s ′ (cur s ′)) ∧
state (the (proc-state s ′ (cur s ′,p))) = READY};
selp = SOME p.
p∈{x. state (the (proc-state s ′ (cur s ′,x))) = READY ∧
(∀ y∈readyprs. priority (the (proc-state s ′ (cur s ′,x))) ≥
priority (the (proc-state s ′ (cur s ′,y))))};
st = the ((proc-state s ′) (cur s ′, selp));
proc-st = proc-state s ′; cur-pr = cur-proc-part s ′ in
{s ′(|proc-state :=
proc-st ((cur s ′, selp) := Some (st(|state := RUNNING|))),
cur-proc-part := cur-pr(cur s ′ := Some selp)|)})
else {s}
Refined Events: All events at the top level are refined
according to the new state type. For instance, the set
partition mode function (Subsection 6.2) at the top level
is refined as follows. When setting a partition to NORMAL
mode, the states of processes in the partition are correctly set
(set procs to normal) according to process state transitions
in Fig. 6. When setting a partition from NORMAL mode
to others, all processes in the partition are deleted (remove
partition resources).
definition set-partition-modeR :: Sys-Config ⇒ StateR ⇒
partition-mode-type⇒ StateR where
set-partition-modeR sc s m ≡
(if (partitions s) (cur s) 6= None ∧
¬ (the ((partitions s) (cur s)) = COLD-START
∧ m = WARM-START) then
let pts = partitions s;
s ′= (if m = NORMAL then
set-procs-to-normal s (cur s)
else if the ((partitions s) (cur s)) = NORMAL then
remove-partition-resources s (cur s)
else s ) in
s ′(|partitions := pts(cur s ′ := Some m )|)
else s)
7.3 Security Proofs
Since the second-level specification is a refinement and
an instance of the security model, the first part of the
security proofs are the instantiation and refinement proofs.
The assumptions (1) - (6) of the security model (Definition
2) have been proven on the second-level specification. In
order to show the refinement relation, conditions (1) - (6) in
Definition 6 are proven on the second-level specification.
The second step of security proofs is to show the UCEs,
i.e. satisfaction of Definitions 3 and 4. By following Theorem
5, we only need to prove that SKC satisfies SC∆ ∧ LR∆ to
show the information-flow security, since the satisfaction of
SCA ∧ LRA in SKA has been proven at the top level and
we have SKA vΨ,Θ SKC . Therefore, we define a set of
concrete conditions for all events on the new state variables.
Satisfaction of the conditions of one event implies that
the event satisfies the unwinding conditions. For instance,
Definition 9 shows the concrete condition of step consistent
for the Schedule Process event, which is an instance of UCEs
on the new state variables (SCC∆(e)) of the event.
Definition 9 (Concrete SCC∆(e) of Schedule Process).
∀ d s t s′ t′ p. RC(s) ∧RC(t) ∧ s d. ∼ . t ∧ s S. ∼ . t
∧ is part conf (cur s) ∧ (cur s); d ∧ s cur s. ∼ . t
∧ s′ ∈ schedule process s ∧ t′ ∈ schedule process t
−→ s′ d. ∼∆ . t′
Finally, we conclude the satisfaction of the noninfluence
property on the second-level specification and all other
information-flow security properties according to Theorem
5 and the inference framework of the security model.
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TABLE 2: Specification and Proof Statistics
Item Specification Proof PM# of type/
definition LOC
# of lemma
/theorem LOP
Security
Model 25 130 63 900 1
Top-level
Specification 116 680 193 5,200 6
Refinement 6 100 42 600 1
2nd-level
Specification 45 330 111 1,100 4
Total 192 1,240 409 7,800 12
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Fig. 7: Proof Reusability
8 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
8.1 Evaluation
We use Isabelle/HOL as the specification and verification
system for ARINC SKs. The proofs are conducted in the
structured proof language Isar in Isabelle, allowing for proof
text naturally understandable for both humans and comput-
ers. All derivations of our proofs have passed through the
Isabelle proof kernel.
The statistics for the effort and size of the specifi-
cation and proofs are shown in Table 2. We use 190
datatypes/definitions and ∼ 1,240 lines of code (LOC) of
Isabelle/HOL to develop the security model, the refinement
framework, and two levels of functional specifications. 409
lemmas/theorems in Isabelle/HOL are proven using ∼
7,800 lines of proof (LOP) of Isar to ensure the information-
flow security of the specification. The work is carried out
by a total effort of roughly 12 person-months (PM). The
proof reusability is shown in Fig. 7. The proof of the security
model is reusable at each level. The proof of our refinement
is reusable at each refinement step. The major part of proof
at each level is UCEs which is reusable at a lower level, for
example ∼ 5,000 LOP of the top-level specification is reused
in the second-level specification.
8.2 Covert Channels and Attack Analysis
When proving the UCEs in our original specification which
is completely compliant with ARINC 653, a few covert
channels are found in the standard. Then, we conduct a
code-to-spec review on VxWorks 653, XtratuM, and POK
in accordance with our formal specification. The covert
channels are also found in them. Table 3 shows the covert
channels and their existence.
Covert channels 1, 2 and 6 actually exist in the ARINC
653 standard. Covert channels 3 and 5 are potential ones and
may be introduced to the specification by careless design.
TABLE 3: The Found Covert Channels
Covert
Channel ARINC standard VxWorks 653 XtratuM POK
(1) X X X X
(2) X X
(3) ∗ X
(4) ∗ ∗
(5) ∗
(6) X X
X: existing; ∗: potential; blank: not existing
Covert channel 4 does not exist in ARINC 653. However, it
is a potential flaw that should be taken into account. They
are described as follows. In Appendix A, we present how
we find and fix them in our specification in detail.
1) Queuing mode channel: If there is a queuing mode
channel from a partition a to a partition b, we find a
covert channel from b to a in ARINC 653.
2) Leakage of port identifiers: In the Send/Receive
Queuing Message and Write/Read Sampling Message ser-
vices, there is no judgement on whether the accessing
port belongs to the current partition. The port identifier
in ARINC 653 is a covert channel.
3) Shared space of port identifiers: In ARINC 653, the
Create Sampling Port and Create Queuing Port services
create a port and return a new unique identifier as-
signed by the kernel to the new port. A potential covert
channel is to use a global variable for unused port
identifiers.
4) Partition scheduling: State related scheduling policies,
such as policies only selecting non-IDLE partitions, is a
covert channel.
5) Shared space of process identifiers: In ARINC 653,
the Create Process service creates a process and assigns
an unique identifier to the created process. A potential
covert channel is to use a global variable for unused
process identifiers.
6) Leakage of process identifiers: In the services of pro-
cess management, there is no judgement on whether
the process belongs to the current partition. Thus, the
locally respects condition is not preserved on the events.
The process identifier in ARINC 653 becomes a covert
channel.
Then we review the source code of implementations
to validate the covert channels. As we consider single-
core separation kernels in this paper, we manually review
the single-core version of the implementations. Since the
reviewed implementations are non-preemptive during the
execution of hypercalls and have the same execution model
as in our specification, it makes sense that we review the
implementations according to our specification. In EAL 7
evaluation of ARINC SKs, to ensure that the proved security
really means that the implementation has the appropriate
behavior, a formal model of the low-level design is created.
Then, the correspondence between the model and the im-
plementation is shown. Since our specification is at high
level, we use the unwinding conditions to manually check
the source code of hypercalls in the implementations, rather
than to show their correspondence.
The result of code review is shown in Table 3. The
version of VxWorks 653 Platform we review is v2.2. The
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covert channel 5 is not found during code review. However,
the covert channel 4 potentially exists and the other four
covert channels are found in VxWorks 653. The version of
XtratuM we review is v3.7.3. The covert channel 1 exists
and the covert channel 4 is a potential one in XtratuM. The
version of POK we review is the latest one released in 2014.
We find the covert channel 1 in POK. In Appendix B, we
present where the covert channels exist in the source code
and how we find them in detail.
The found covert channels pose threats to real-world
ARINC SKs. In order to analyze the potential attacks, we
assume a threat model of ARINC SKs in which all user-
level code in partitions is malicious and acting to break
the security policy. The attacker’s goal is to read or infer
the information in partitions that should remain secret to
it according to the policy. Malicious programs in partitions
could utilise the covert channels to break the security policy.
The security risk of covert channels 1, 2, and 6 is high. Secu-
rity information in a secret partition can be easily leaked by
attackers. The covert channel 4 is a timing channel. Covert
channels 3 and 5 have low bandwidth in real-world systems.
We illustrate potential attacks to ARINC SKs in Appendix C
in detail.
8.3 Discussion
The refinement-based specification and analysis method in
the paper is compliant to the EAL 7 of CC certification.
With regard to the EAL 7, the main requirements addressed
by formal methods are (1) a formal security policy model
(SPM) of Target of Evaluation (TOE), (2) a complete semi-
formal functional specification (FSP) with an additional
formal specification, and (3) a complete semi-formal and
modular design with high-level TOE design specification
(TDS). The security model in this paper represents the
security policies of ARINC SKs and is a formal model of
the SPM. The two levels of functional specifications in this
paper correspond to the FSP. The properties demonstrated
on the SPM are formally preserved down to the FSP by the
model instantiation and instantiation proofs. The functional
specification can be refined to a TDS model using the step-
wise refinement. The refinement provides the formal link
between the FSP and the TDS. Finally, code-to-spec review
can be considered between the last formal model of the TDS
and the implementation to show the correspondence. In this
paper, we conduct a code review of the implementations
according to our specification.
The method in this paper can alleviate the efforts of CC
certification. The instantiation of the security model and the
refinement framework ease the development and make the
proof easier. As the same in the high assurance levels of CC
certification of INTEGRITY-178B and AAMP7G [51], formal
model and proof are part of the evaluation and directly
submitted to the evaluation team for certification. Certainly,
formal model and proof should be created in accordance
with a set of “safe” rules, such as rules of Isabelle/HOL in
[48], which have been complied with by our specification.
On the other hand, for a specific TOE in CC certification,
our specification may be revised and TDS model has to be
developed.
9 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a refinement-based spec-
ification development and security analysis method for
ARINC SKs. By the proposed superposition refinement,
we have developed two levels of formal specification. We
provided the mechanically checked proofs of information-
flow security to overcome covert channels in separation
kernels. We revealed some security flaws in ARINC 653 and
implementations. In the next step, we will refine the second-
level specification to lower levels by adding services of com-
plicated process management and intra-partition communi-
cation. Supporting multi-core is also under consideration in
future. Due to the kernel concurrency between cores, we are
developing rely-guarantee based approach to specify and
verify multi-core separation kernels.
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APPENDIX A
COVERT CHANNELS IN ARINC 653
The covert channels in ARINC 653 are discussed and fixed
in our specification as follows.
Covert Channel 1 - Queuing mode channel: If there is
a queuing mode channel from a partition a to a partition b
and no other channels exist, then it is secure that a ; T,
T ; b, T /; a and b /; T according to the security
policies in this paper. Actually, these security policies are
violated in ARINC 653. First, when a sends a message by
invoking the Send Queuing Message service of ARINC 653,
the service returns NOT AVAILABLE or TIMED OUT when
the buffer is full, and returns NO ERROR when the buffer
is not full. However, the full/empty status of the buffer in
the port can be changed by message transmission executed
by the transmitter. Thus, the locally respects condition is
not preserved on the event of message transmission, and
T /; a is violated. Second, due to no message loss allowed in
ARINC 653, the transmitter cannot transmit a message on a
channel when the destination queuing port is full. However,
the full status of the destination port can be changed by the
Receive Queuing Message service executed by the partition
b. Thus, the locally respects condition is not preserved on
Receive Queuing Message, and b /; T is violated. To avoid
this covert channel, we allow message loss on queuing mode
channels in our specification.
Covert Channel 2 - Leakage of port identifiers: It is
assumed in ARINC 653 that a port identifier is only stored
in a partition after creation. In the Send/Receive Queuing
Message and Write/Read Sampling Message services, there is
no judgement on whether the accessing port belongs to
the current partition. Thus, the locally respects condition is
not preserved on the events. In this case, programs in a
partition can guess the port identifiers of other partitions
and then manipulate the ports. Therefore, the port identifier
in ARINC 653 is a covert channel. This covert channel
is avoided in our specification by checking that the port
belongs to the current partition.
Covert Channel 3 - Shared space of port identifiers: In
ARINC 653, the Create Sampling Port and Create Queuing
Port services create a port and return a new unique identifier
assigned by the kernel to the new port. Careless design of
the port identifier can cause covert channels. In the initial
specification, we use a natural number to maintain this
new identifier. This number is initially assigned to “1” and
increased by one after each port creation. In such as design,
the two events do not preserve the step consistent condition.
Thus, the number becomes a covert channel that can flow
information from any partition to others. This covert chan-
nel is then avoided in our specification by assigning the port
identifier to each port during system initialization or in the
system configuration.
Covert Channel 4 - Partition scheduling: ARINC 653
defines a cyclic partition scheduling. The time windows
of a partition in the IDLE mode are not preempted by
other partitions. The result of executing the Schedule event
is that the current executing partition is set to a partition
or the message transmitter. Although some partition is in
IDLE mode, it is also possible to be selected. That means
the execution of Schedule is independent with the state
of partitions. However, state related scheduling policies,
such as policies only selecting non-IDLE partitions, do not
have the information-flow security. In such a case, the step
consistent condition is not preserved on the Schedule event,
and the Set Partition Mode service in partitions can interfere
with the scheduler. This covert channel can be avoided by
disabling the insecure partition scheduling.
Covert Channel 5 - Shared space of process identifiers:
In ARINC 653, the Create Process service creates a process
and assigns an unique identifier to the created process. Care-
less design of the process identifier can cause covert chan-
nels. In the initial specification, we use global identifiers.
When creating a process, we assign a new identifier which
is not used by created processes. In such as design, the
Create Process service does not preserve the step consistent
condition. Thus, the global identifiers become covert chan-
nels that can flow information from any partition to others.
This covert channel is then avoided in our specification by
assigning a new identifier which is not used by created pro-
cesses in current executing partition. Unlike communication
ports, processes in ARINC 653 are not configured at built-
time.
Covert Channel 6 - Leakage of process identifiers: It
is assumed in ARINC 653 that a process identifier is only
stored in a partition after creation. In process management
services, e.g. Start/Stop/Suspend/Resume Process, there is no
judgement on whether the process belongs to the current
partition. Thus, the locally respects condition is not preserved
on the events. In such a case, programs in a partition can
guess the process identifiers of other partitions and then
manipulate them. Therefore, created processes in ARINC
653 become covert channels. This covert channel is avoided
in our specification by checking that the process belongs to
the current partition.
APPENDIX B
COVERT CHANNELS IN IMPLEMENTATIONS
We find five covert channels in VxWorks shown as follows.
The covert channel 5 is not found during code review.
Covert channel 1: In VxWorks 653, the message trans-
mission is not implemented as a system event, but invoked
by the Send Queuing Message service. If there is a queuing
mode channel c from a partition a to a partition b and
no other channels exist, then it is secure that a ; b and
b /; a. VxWorks uses the portQMsgPut and portQMsgGet
functions to implement the Send Queuing Message and Re-
ceive Queuing Message services, respectively. According to
the source code of portQMsgPut, we find that when partition
a sends messages and the source port of c is full, it invokes
the portQMsgDistribute function to transmit messages in the
source port to the destination port. But when the destination
port is also full, the portQMsgPut function returns an error.
However, the full status of the destination port can be
changed by the portQMsgGet function executed in partition
b. Thus, the locally respects condition is not preserved on
portQMsgGet, and covert channel 1 exists in VxWorks 653.
Covert channel 2: VxWorks 653 uses the portSMsg-
Put and portSMsgGet functions to implement the Write
Sampling Message and Read Sampling Message services, re-
spectively. According to the source code of the portQMsgPut,
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portQMsgGet, portSMsgPut, and portSMsgGet functions, we
find that when accessing a port, VxWorks 653 does not check
that the port belongs to the current partition. Thus, these
functions executed in a partition can manipulate ports in
another noninterfering partition. The locally respects condi-
tion is not preserved on these functions and covert channel
2 exists in VxWorks 653.
Covert channel 3: VxWorks 653 uses the portQCreate and
portSCreate functions to implement the Create Queuing Port
and Create Sampling Port services, respectively. According
to the source code of portQCreate and portSCreate, VxWorks
653 uses an object classifier to allocate port identifiers by
invoking the objAlloc function. When invoking objAlloc, it
uses the same object class (portQClassId) for all queuing
ports. Thus, the step consistent condition is not preserved
on the two functions and the portQClassId becomes a covert
channel, i.e. covert channel 3.
Covert channel 4: Beside the ARINC 653 partition
scheduling, in which the partition scheduler is not inter-
fered by partitions, VxWorks also supports Priority Pre-
emptive Scheduling (PPS) for partitions. The PPS runs AR-
INC partitions in a priority pre-emptive manner during idle
time in an ARINC schedule. The PPS is implemented in
the ppsSchedulePartition function, which choose the parti-
tion with the highest priority and ready tasks. In such a
scheduling, the step consistent condition is not preserved on
the ppsSchedulePartition function, and the Set Partition Mode
service and the services of process management in partitions
can interfere with the scheduler. Thus, covert channel 4
potentially exists.
Covert channel 6: VxWorks 653 uses the taskActivate,
taskStop, taskSuspend, and taskResume functions to imple-
ment the Start Process, Stop Process, Suspend Process, and
Resume Process services, respectively. In these functions of
VxWorks 653, it does not check that the accessing task
belongs to the current partition. Thus, the locally respects
condition is not preserved on the functions. In such a case,
programs in a partition may manipulate tasks in other
partitions that the partition can not interfere with. Therefore,
created tasks in VxWorks 653 become covert channels, i.e.
covert channel 6.
We find two covert channels in XtratuM as follows.
During code review of unwinding conditions, other covert
channels are not found.
Covert channel 1: XtratuM uses one shared buffer be-
tween the source port and the destination port of a queuing
mode channel as a transmitter. If there is a queuing mode
channel c from a partition a to a partition b and no other
channels exist, then it is secure that a ; b and b /; a.
XtratuM uses the SendQueuingPort and ReceiveQueuingPort
hypercalls to implement the Send Queuing Message and Re-
ceive Queuing Message services, respectively. According to
the source code of SendQueuingPort, we find if the buffer is
not full, the hypercall SendQueuingPort inserts the message
into the buffer and notifies the receiver; whilst if the buffer
is full, SendQueuingPort immediately returns XM OP NOT
ALLOWED. However, the full status of the buffer can be
changed by the ReceiveQueuingPort hypercall executed in
partition b. Thus, the locally respects condition is not pre-
served on ReceiveQueuingPort, and covert channel 1 exists in
XtratuM.
Covert channel 4: Beside the ARINC 653 partition
scheduling, in which the partition scheduler is not interfered
by partitions, XtratuM also supports fixed priority partition
scheduling (FPS). The FPS chooses the READY partition
with the highest priority to be executed. The Schedule func-
tion in XtratuM could be configured at built-time as FPS
or ARINC 653 scheduling. In the FPS, the step consistent
condition is not preserved on the Schedule function, and the
Set Partition Mode service in partitions can interfere with
the scheduler. Thus, covert channel 4 exists in XtratuM.
We find one covert channel in POK as follows. During
code review of unwinding conditions, other covert channels
are not found.
Covert channel 1: POK has a transmitter to transfer
messages from a source port to a destination port of a
channel. POK blocks processes to wait for resources. If
there is a queuing mode channel from a partition a to a
partition b and no other channels exist, then it is secure that
a ; T, T ; b, T /; a and b /; T. POK uses the pok
port queueing send and pok port queueing receive syscalls to
implement the Send Queuing Message and Receive Queuing
Message services, respectively. First, according to the source
code of pok port queueing send, we find if the buffer of
the source port is not full, pok port queueing send inserts
the message into the buffer; whilst if the buffer is full
and timeout = 0, it immediately returns POK ERRNO
FULL. However, the full status of the source port can be
changed by the pok port transfer function which is in charge
of transmitting messages from a source port to a destination
one. Thus, the locally respects condition is not preserved on
pok port transfer, and T /; a is violated. Second, pok port
transfer returns POK ERRNO SIZE when the destination
port has no available space to store messages. However, the
full status of the destination port can be changed by the pok
port queueing receive function executed by partition b. Thus,
the locally respects condition is not preserved on pok port
queueing receive, and b /; T is violated.
APPENDIX C
ATTACK ANALYSIS OF COVERT CHANNELS
We illustrate potential attacks to ARINC SKs as follows.
Covert channel 1: It is a typical storage channel between
a sender and a receiver [1]. If there is a queuing mode chan-
nel from a partition a to a partition b, malicious programs
in a and b can collaborate to create a covert channel from
b to a. Partition a sends messages to the channel until the
buffer is full. Then, the receive event in b can be inferred by
a, and thus a gets one bit of information from b at each time
of receive. By the covert channel, any secret information in b
can be sent to a.
Covert channel 2: It is a storage channel about resource
isolation and leakage in ARINC SKs. Let’s assume a system
with three partitions (a, b, and c) and a communication
channel ch from b to c. According to security policies, infor-
mation in a cannot be leaked to other partitions. However,
by the covert channel, malicious programs in partition a can
manipulate the channel ch and send secret information of a
to c.
Covert channels 3 and 5: They are storage channels on
the shared identifiers among partitions. Malicious programs
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in partitions have to create resources (ports and processes)
to reach the maximum number of the identifiers, and then
can send one bit of information. Thus, the covert channels
have very low bandwidth in real-world systems.
Covert channel 4: It is a timing channel by the PPS in
VxWorks 653 and the FPS in XtratuM. Higher prioritised
partitions can directly influence when and for how long
lower prioritised partitions run [2].
Covert channel 6: It is a storage channel about resource
isolation and leakage in ARINC SKs. Assume a system with
a set of partitions and there is no communication channel
between partitions a and b. According to security policies,
information in a and b has to be isolated. However, by the
covert channel, malicious programs in a can manipulate the
processes (e.g. change the process state) in b, and thus send
some bits of information to b at each time.
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